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J. H. Scott  
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# INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

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## OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS BEARING UPON THE EUROPEAN WAR

- I THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE TO SERVIA
- II THE SERBIAN REPLY
- III THE BRITISH WHITE PAPER
- IV THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK



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The Executive Committee of the Association for International Conciliation wish to arouse the interest of the American people in the progress of the movement, for promoting international peace and relations of comity and good fellowship between nations. To this end they print and circulate documents giving information as to the progress or interruption of these movements, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have readily available accurate information on these subjects. A list of publications will be found on page 124.

## PRESIDENT WILSON'S APPEAL FOR IMPARTIALITY AND RESTRAINT IN DIS- CUSSING THE WAR

MY FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN: I suppose that every thoughtful man in America has asked himself during the last troubled weeks what influence the European war may exert upon the United States, and I take the liberty of addressing a few words to you in order to point out that it is entirely within our own choice what its effects upon us will be and to urge very earnestly upon you the sort of speech and conduct which will best safeguard the nation against distress and disaster.

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say or do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon what our ministers utter in their pulpits and men proclaim as their opinions on the streets.

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility; responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinions, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion, if not in action. Such diversions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.

I venture, therefore, my fellow-countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.

My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action, a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

Shall we not resolve to put upon ourselves the restraint which will bring to our people the happiness and the great and lasting influence for peace we covet for them?



# I

## NOTE ADDRESSED TO THE SERVIAN GOVERNMENT BY THE AUSTRO- HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT ON JULY 23, 1914

On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:

"Servia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers Servia undertakes to renounce from now onward the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last Autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter."

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the monarchy and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and

functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and, finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The above-mentioned results of the Magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquility of the monarchy.

To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it undertakes to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its Official Journal of the 26th June (13th July) the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—i. e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress."

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the royal army as an order of the day by his Majesty the King and shall be published in the Official Bulletin of the army.

The Royal Servian Government further undertakes:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruc-

tion, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserves to itself the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy;

6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voijs Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo;

8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note.

## II

# REPLY OF SERVIAN GOVERNMENT TO AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skupshchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighboring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which as a general rule escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighboring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial

and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromise the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavor."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of his Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake:

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skupshtina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present time, at the inquiry at Serajevo, for the purposes of the latter inquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime, and which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile toward the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above

heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

### III

## “THE WHITE PAPER”

Issued by the British Foreign Office on August 5, 1914

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### PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE

COUNT BENCKENDORFF . . . .	Russian Ambassador at London.
COUNT BERCHTOLD . . . .	Austrian Foreign Minister.
SIR F. BERTIE . . . .	British Ambassador at Paris.
SIR G. BUCHANAN . . . .	British Ambassador at St. Petersburg
SIR M. DE BUNSEN . . . .	British Ambassador at Vienna.
M. CAMBON . . . .	French Ambassador to Germany.
MR. CRACKANTHORPE . . . .	First Secretary in British Diplomatic Service at Belgrade.
SIR E. GOSCHEN . . . .	British Ambassador at Berlin.
SIR EDWARD GREY . . . .	British Foreign Secretary.
PRINCE LICHNOWSKY . . . .	German Ambassador to Great Britain.
COUNT MENSENDORFF . . . .	Austrian Ambassador to Great Britain.
SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON . . . .	Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
SIR R. RODD . . . .	British Ambassador at Rome.
SIR R. RUMBOLD . . . .	Of the British Diplomatic Service.
MARQUIS DI SAN GIULIANO . . . .	Foreign Minister of Italy.
M. SAZONOF . . . .	Russian Premier.
M. SUCHOMLINOF . . . .	Russian Minister for War.
COUNT SZAPARY . . . .	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Russia.
PRINCE TROUBETZKOY . . . .	General attached to the military household of the Czar of Russia.
SIR F. VILLIERS . . . .	British Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Belgium.
M. VIVIANI . . . .	Premier of France.



**No. 1. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

London, Foreign Office, July 20, 1914.

Sir: I asked the German Ambassador today if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Serbia.

He said that he had not but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold, in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Serbia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Serbia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be made known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the great powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Serbia would be detestable.

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

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**No. 2. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 22, 1914.

Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian démarche at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Serbia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had, therefore, considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. He had, how-

ever, on several occasions in conversation with the Servian Minister emphasized the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude adopted toward Servia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance.

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### No. 3. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen

London, Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.

Sir: Count Mensdorff told me today that he would be able tomorrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Servia today by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me tomorrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia.

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with, a time limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. I admitted that, if there was no time limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time limit could always be introduced afterward; that, if the demands were made without a time limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favor of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an inquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909 Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighborhood

with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself.

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an interference with trade that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favorable recently,

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

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#### No. 4. Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff

(Communicated by Count Mensdorff, Vienna, July 24, 1914.)

(Translation.)

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Serbian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:

I have the honor to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations:

*Already printed, see pages 5--7.*

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members Generals and diplomatists, Government officials and Judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighboring monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom. Individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it incumbent on it to take the slightest step. The Servian Government has thus failed in the duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude toward the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandizement of Servia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed toward the neighboring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government has felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government is convinced that in taking this step it will find itself in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilized nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government holds at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the imperial and royal representatives accredited to the other signatory powers.

You are authorized to leave a copy of this dispatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

## ANNEX

The criminal inquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last, has up to the present led to the following conclusions:

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, one Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosic.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez, by the man Milan Ciganovic and Commander Voija Tankosic at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades, coming from the arms depot of the Servian Army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to insure the success of the act, Ciganovic taught Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabez in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider.

5. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organized by Ciganovic.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabac (Rade Popovic) and Loznica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbic of Loznica, with the assistance of various individuals.

**No. 5. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

Note addressed to Serbia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia.

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of his Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.

Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Serbia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Serbia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Serbia's part.

I said that if Serbia had procrastinated in replying a time limit could have been introduced later; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Serbian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation.

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**No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless

Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that his Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But, supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably tomorrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack upon Servia by Austria would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war, if it did break out; we

should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped his Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

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**No. 7. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia could not leave Russia indifferent.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 P. M. tomorrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any power.

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**No. 8. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 24, 1914.

Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that his Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.



## No. 9. Note Communicated by German Ambassador

London, July 24, 1914.

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realize them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed toward the detachment of the southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporated into the Servian kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army.

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic interference of the great powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity; to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a great power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfillment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.

The Imperial Government want to emphasize their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the great powers ought seriously to endeavor to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localization of the conflict, because every interference of another power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences.

No. 10. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie

London, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

Sir: After telling M. Cambon today of the Austrian communication to Serbia which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburg. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it: but if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any power interested in Serbia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg.

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Serbia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilized, it would be possible for the four powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other powers.

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Serbia.

He replied that it was so.

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

**No. 11. Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Serbia. I understand the German Government is making the same communication to the powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburg, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavor to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Serbia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State.

Prince Lichnowsky said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Serbia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands in toto. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Serbia; a reply favorable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria.

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**No. 12. Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests.

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favorably to as many points as the time limit allows.

Servian Minister here has begged that his Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to Servian Government.

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.

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• **No. 13. Note Communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25**

(Translation.)

M. Sazonof telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914:

"The Communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna.

"M. Sazonof hopes that his Britannic Majesty's Government will share to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna."

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**No. 14. Sir Edward Grey to F. Bertie and to Sir G. Buchanan**  
(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

Austrian Ambassador has been authorized to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a démarche with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the

time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at Paris, (St. Petersburg,) you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

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**No. 15. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 25, 1914.

I learn from the Acting Political Director that the French Government has not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government contained in your telegram today.\* They have, however, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade, of yesterday.†

\* See No. 14. † See No. 12.

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**No. 16. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 25, 1914.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as at Belgrade. He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favorable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.

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**No. 17. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of today to Paris,\* and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade.†

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is

\* See No. 14. † See No. 12.

too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, that Serbia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Serbia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade and withdraw their forces into the interior while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favor of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Serbia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.

If Serbia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Serbia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in favor of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.

I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend, who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and warned him that if Russia mobilized Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.

#### No. 18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Your telegram of the 24th July \* acted on.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately

\* See No. 11.

instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburg. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localized. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand and that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had, in fact, had no such knowledge.

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#### No. 19. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 25, 1914.

I saw the Secretary General this morning and found that he knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Servia became menacing. In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway.

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#### No. 20. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced

that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 P. M. today.

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl today to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes.

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**No. 21. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply:

The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declaration in the Official Gazette. The ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of inquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana.

The Servian Government consider that unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.

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**No. 22. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

I have seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views.

They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I have up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government.

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government.

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**No. 23. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

The Austrian Minister left at 6:30.

The Government has left for Nisch, where the Skupshtina will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the Vice Consul is remaining in charge of the archives.



**No. 24. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of his Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of yesterday,\* and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian démarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential.

\* See No. 6.

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**No. 25. Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador has been authorized to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilization before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed.

Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilization of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia\* and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them.

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but that once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. He expressed himself as personally favorable to this suggestion.

\* This is apparently a misprint and should read "Italy."

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Serbia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilization, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were traveling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not, therefore, be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it.

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**No. 26. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram, which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"The delay given to Serbia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Serbia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning."

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian colleague.

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps.

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**No. 27. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, and Sir G. Buchanan**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

I have communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of today.\* I have said

\* See No. 21.

that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favorable view of it.

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**No. 28**

(Nil.)

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**No. 29. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd**

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

Sir:—The Italian Ambassador came to see me today. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

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**No. 30. Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crakanthorpe**

London, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

Sir:—The Servian Minister called on the 23d instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary.

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the inquiry at Serajevo—an inquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy—disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organizing plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation.

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects—Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual.

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavor to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

**No. 31. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent.

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**No. 32. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over, and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Rumanian, and Persian questions, being brought into the melting pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. One naturally sympathized with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she required; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. He asked whether I had been informed that a pretense of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy

the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilization and retirement of Government from Belgrade.

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**No. 33. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 26, 1914.

Emperor returns suddenly tonight, and Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on his Majesty's own initiative. They fear that his Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement. Under Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory.

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**No. 34. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 26, 1914.

Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favorable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram No. 52 of 25th July.

Under Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this.

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**No. 35. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 26, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference and will instruct Italian Ambassador tonight accordingly.

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war.

**No. 36. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold and Sir R. Rodd**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg could be authorized to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

**No. 37. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

Berlin telegram of 25th July.\*

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four powers if necessary.

\* See No. 18.

**No. 38. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 27.)

Rome, July 23, 1914.

Sir: I gather that the Italian Government have been made cognizant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusionings which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success.

I have, &c.,

RENNELL RODD.

**No. 39. Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note**

(Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.)

*Already printed, see pages 8-11*

**No. 40. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Telegraphic.)

(Received July 27.)

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant, \*(last paragraph).

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris arrived I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being

\* See No. 26. † See No. 36.

an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken.

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**No. 41. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Telegraphic.)

(Received July 27.)

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake, and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of his Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.

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**No. 42. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 27, 1914.

Your proposal as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,\* is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so.

\* Nos. 36 and 37.

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**No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

Your telegram of 26th July.\*

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called

\* See No. 36.

together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was no intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilizing, but that if Russia mobilized against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilizing against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilized in south, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

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#### No. 44. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

Austrian Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution, seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government.

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of his Majesty's Government in my



conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant.\* I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization ukase for as long as possible and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps toward mobilization could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long.

\* See No. 6.

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**No. 45. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

Since my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of today,\* I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

\* See No. 44.

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**No. 46. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

German Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localize the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went further than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences

that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localized, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

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**No. 47. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

See my telegram of today to Sir E. Goschen.\*

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments.

\* See No. 37.

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**No. 48. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen**

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

Sir:—Count Mensdorff told me by instruction today that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending toward continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many

years endeavored to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbor, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to every one what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced, and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the southeastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defense. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an element of general unrest, such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localizing the fight, if necessary.

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Servia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defense and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory.

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing—the co-operation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

I said it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia and at the same time pacify Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed

out that our fleet was to have dispersed today, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

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**No. 49. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd**

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

Sir:—The Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson today that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London.

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis di San Giuliano would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, and would inquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

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**No. 50. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 31.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honor to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia.

I have, &c.,

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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ENCLOSURE IN No. 50.

Copy of Note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914.

(Translation.)

In order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the Royal Servian Government a note in which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Servian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial

and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary, who had just addressed to Serbia a formal declaration, in conformity with Article 1 of the convention of the 18th October, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Serbia.

In bringing the above notice of his Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honor to declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the Conventions of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London of the 28th February, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted by Serbia.

The embassy is requested to be so good as to communicate the present notification as soon as possible to the British Government.

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**No. 51. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 28.)

Paris, July 27, 1914.

Sir:—I have the honor to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

I have, &c.,

FRANCIS BERTIE.

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**ENCLOSURE IN No. 51.**

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin.

(Translation.)

In a note of the 25th of this month, his Excellency the British Ambassador informed the Government of the Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only possible way of assuring the maintenance of peace in case of the relations between Russia and Austria becoming more strained would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action; and he expressed the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were disposed to welcome such a suggestion.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs ad interim has the honor to inform his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he has requested M. Jules Cambon to concert with the British Ambassador in Germany and to support any representation which they may consider it advisable to make to the Berlin Cabinet.

In accordance with the desire expressed by the British Government and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his note of the 26th of this month, the Government of the Republic have also authorized M. Paul Cambon

to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed with a view to discovering a means of settling the present difficulties.

The Government of the Republic is likewise ready to instruct the representatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Servian Governments to abstain from all active military operations pending the results of this conference. He considers, however, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essentially on the action which the Berlin Government would be willing to take at Vienna. Representations made to the Austro-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about a suspension of military operations would seem bound to fail unless the German Government do not beforehand exercise their influence on the Vienna Cabinet.

The President of the Council ad interim takes the opportunity, &c.  
Paris, July 27, 1914.

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#### **No. 52. Note Communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914**

(Translation.)

The Government of the Republic accepts Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Servia; and they have authorized M. P. Cambon to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London.

The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the British Ambassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appropriate.

M. Viviani is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade instructions in the sense suggested by the British Government.

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#### **No. 53. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff**

(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

(Translation.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

The British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which I hope may be favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossi-

ble, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favorable solution of the conflict.

I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial Cabinet.

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**No. 54. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff**

(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28, 1914.)

(Telegraphic.)

(Translation.)

St. Petersburg, July 15 (28), 1914.

My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany, is, if anything, in favor of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient.

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other power to make another attempt to Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

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**No. 55. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

With reference to my telegram of yesterday,\* I saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic.

He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers throughout the conversations that would ensue.

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers.

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to me, and inquired whether instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed. The German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had

\* See No. 44.

expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary.

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.

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**No. 56. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador had today a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburg, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Serbia it would be impossible to localize it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Serbia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Serbia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behavior. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Serbia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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**No. 57. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 27, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the confer-



ence, but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Serbia, but he believes that if Serbia will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Serbia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favorably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he had expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and after communication of the note, and again today, that Austrian Government have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from Serbia.

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**No. 58. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I communicated to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded in your telegram \* to Berlin of the 27th July.

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace.

\* See No. 46.

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**No. 59. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs today of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday \* to St. Petersburg.

He is grateful for the communication and quite appreciates the impossibility for his Majesty's Government to declare themselves "solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Serbia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Serbian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government.

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Serbia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.

\* See No. 47.

**No. 60. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

Secretary of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday \* to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, and we found, that while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.

\* See No. 43.

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**No. 61. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike proceedings against Servia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply.

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict.

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**No. 62. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs today in the sense of your telegram of 27th July \* to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but said that, as mentioned in your speech,† which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared today, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that

\* See No. 46. † "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Cols. 931, 932, 933.

must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Serbia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Serbia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandizement and which could no longer be postponed.

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**No. 63. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

Your telegram of 25th July to Paris.\*

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna.

\* See No. 27.

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**No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you:

In a long conversation this morning Servian Chargé d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under Article V. and Article VI., Serbia might still accept the whole Austrian note.

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Serbia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Serbia to accept without conditions.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation—such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propaganda—quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Chargé d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Serbia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial

or administrative measures. Serbia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here.

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration.

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador.

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**No. 65. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 28, 1914.

I have urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending efforts being made toward a peaceful solution.

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged and two Servian merchant vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.

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**No. 66. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 28, 1914.

Telegram received here that war declared by Austria.

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**No. 67. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

Explanation given in your telegram of the 27th July\* of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies.

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all.

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.†

\* See No. 43. † See No. 46.

**No. 68. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

German Government having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress.

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**No. 69. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

It is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th July.\*

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape.

\* See No. 55.

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**No. 70. Telegrams Communicated by Count Benckendorff,  
July 29, 1914**

- (1) Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914.

In consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia, the Imperial Government will announce tomorrow (29th) the mobilization in the military circumscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

- (2) Telegram to Count Benckendorff.

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Serbia is now most urgent.

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Serbia.

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**No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

At invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening. He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of

general peace, as they had done successfully in the last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference would, in his opinion, have had appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided," were his last words.

Austrian colleague said to me today that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.

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**No. 72. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram \* to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news from Vienna as had reached his Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurance which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Servia's integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangements for averting a European war would be welcomed by his Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked, Russia would not be satisfied

\* See No. 46.

with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilization against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier.

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria.

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions.

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**No. 73. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I have received note verbale from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23d July \* in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Servia formal declaration, according to Article I of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from today in state of war with Servia. Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to declaration of London of 26th February, 1909.

\* See No. 4.

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**No. 74. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who should be authorized accordingly.

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned.

**No. 75. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I was sent for again today by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to accupon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, dispatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Servia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realize that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications.

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated.

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**No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

1) I found Secretary of State very depressed today. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a fait accompli. This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Servia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilization in Russia and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French



colleague said to Under Secretary of State in course of conversation that seemed to him that when Austria had entered Serbia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favorable for four disinterested powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you.

Russian Ambassador returned today and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilizing in four southern governments.

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**No. 77. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

I much appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram of today.\* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.

\* See No. 75.

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**No. 78. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

Partial mobilization was ordered today.

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant\* to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilization which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilization, he explained, would only be directed against Austria.

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors, either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to accept.

\* See No. 67.

Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realized by the British public that it was not fault of the Russian Government.

I asked him whether he would raise objections, if the suggestion made in Rome telegram of 27th July,<sup>†</sup> which I mentioned to him, were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers, provided it was acceptable to Serbia; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Serbia. Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th instant<sup>‡</sup> was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to me today. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that Austrian Consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colors, that Austria had already partially mobilized, and had now declared war on Serbia. From what had passed during the Balkan crises, she knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilizing shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobilization was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation, it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.

<sup>†</sup> See No. 57. <sup>‡</sup> See No. 69.

## No. 79. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

There is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Serbia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people, which has been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Serbia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. This, however, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do.

**No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 29, 1914.

In your telegram of the 27th instant\* to Berlin, German Ambassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instant† from Berlin.

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,† but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin tonight, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if the direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburg fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct communication.

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Government must lend their co-operation in this.

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect.

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views.

\* See No. 46. † See No. 43.

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**No. 81. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

With reference to your telegram of yesterday.\*

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favorable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there.

\* See No. 64.

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**No. 82. Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, July 29, 1914.

I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered

this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian Army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule.

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**No. 83. Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 29, 1914.

I have been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant in the House of Commons.

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**No. 84. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

The German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor to inform me that he is endeavoring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government had declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorized to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict. The press correspondents at St. Petersburg had been told that Russian Government would mobilize. The German Government had said that they were favorable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation, or discussion, or even conversations à quatre in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace.

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**No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor tonight. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realization of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of today\* to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.

\* See No. 77.

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**No. 86. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 29, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made today by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilization. The utmost he now hopes for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Servia.

**No. 87. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie**

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—After telling M. Cambon today how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador today that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that the public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honor and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance, France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

**No. 88. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—I told the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her

mobilization. I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff, that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared today. Today the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning, and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Serbia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters and give Austria time to crush Serbia. It was of course too late for all military operations against Serbia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Serbian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Serbia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed Berlin what I had said to him this morning,

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

#### No. 89. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should under certain circumstances intervene.

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved prac-

tically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

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**No. 90. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—In addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning, as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July\* to your Excellency, I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's telegram of the 28th July† and of my reply to it.‡ I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Serbia would now satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with Serbia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Serbia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian territory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn Serbia practically into a vassal State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans.

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently were taking precautions.

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found for preserving the peace of Europe.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

\* See No. 84. † See No. 64. ‡ See No. 81.



**No. 91. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen**

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—The Austrian Ambassador told me today he had ready a long memorandum, which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of the conduct of Serbia toward Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action was.

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Serbia. The news today seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorff said that the war with Serbia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilizing again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandizement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded.

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Serbia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State.

Count Mensdorff deprecated this.

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Serbia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

**No. 92. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd**

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir:—The Italian Ambassador made me today a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favored by Italy, might be removed by some change of the form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

**No. 93. Telegrams Communicated by Count Benckendorff,  
July 30, 1914**

(1.) Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.

I spoke to Count Berchtold today in the sense of your Excellency's instructions. I brought to his notice, in the most friendly manner, how

desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Servia.

I drew Count Berchtold's attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be involved by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

Count Berchtold replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the energetic measures which they had taken against Servia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement, that the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the more impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Servian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Servia's promises for the future.

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(2.) M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff  
(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.

The German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there has been no news that the Austrian army has crossed the Servian frontier. I have begged the Ambassador to express my thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenor of this communication. I have informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I told him, were directed against Germany; I added that neither should they be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation being the mobilization of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Ambassador said that he was in favor of direct explanations between the Austrian Government and ourselves, and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he had referred, found an echo at Vienna.

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account the most suitable methods of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four powers—Germany, France, England, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Servia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good-will and that all the powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

(3.) M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.

At the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schébeko's telegram of the 15th (28th) July.

The telegram reports the refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government.

From now on nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in the steps which they may consider advisable.

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No. 94. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

I learn that the mobilization of Russian corps destined to carry out operations on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realized, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. I believe that the news of Russian mobilization will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless mediation which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-Servian dispute be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns surprise that Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him today. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favorable spirit; if approached in a proper manner he thought she would probably go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides he personally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers.

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Servia.

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No. 95. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

Russian Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilization will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be con-

sulted regarding the fate of Serbia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Serbia will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Serbia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory.

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war.

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity.

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he indorses every line of it.

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**No. 96. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilized, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg continuing their conversation, although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Servian reply.

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumor that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilization. He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria.

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**No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.

French Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so but nevertheless Serbia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian

vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 A. M., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is translation:

"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Serbia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations."

Preparations for general mobilization will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that if Austria refuses to make a concession Russia cannot hold back, and, now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilization.

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**No. 98. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from there. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilization against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilized against Serbia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilization and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave—a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador yesterday—Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilized they would have to mobilize on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly

with surprise; and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in way he had done.

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**No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 30, 1914.

President of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stopped her mobilization Germany would mobilize. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburg, states that the German communication had been modified, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilization. The answer is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Serbia, and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for his Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilization so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep his Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

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**No. 100. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 30, 1914.

German Ambassador told me last night that he thought that Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Serbia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula

might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange of views.

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion.

**No. 101. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

Your telegram of 29th July.\*

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligations or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for trying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that one way of maintaining good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

\* See No. 85.

**No. 102. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

I have warned Prince Lichnowsky that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to German Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.\*

\* See No. 98.

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**No. 103. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

German Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further while Powers endeavored to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would, of course, be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof, as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,\* and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

\* See No. 97.

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**No. 104. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of today,\* and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburg.

\* See No. 103.



**No. 105. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie**

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

Sir:—M. Cambon reminded me today of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I inclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also inclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit.

I said that the Cabinet was to meet tomorrow morning, and I would see him again tomorrow afternoon.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 105

**Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon**

London, Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912.

My dear Ambassador:—From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,

E. GREY.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 105

**M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey**

(Translation.)

French Embassy, London, Nov. 23, 1912.

Dear Sir Edward:—You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22d November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time, that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an attack from a third power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common. If those measures involved action the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their General Staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c.,

PAUL CAMBON.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 105

**French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon**

(Translation.)

The German Army had its advance posts on our frontiers yesterday (Friday). German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilometers from the frontier. The local population is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th corps from Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strassburg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands. This is the last stage before mobilization, whereas we have not called out a single reservist.

As you see, Germany has done it. I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday, the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in.

These facts, added to those contained in my telegram of yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive intentions of the other.

Paris, July 31 [sic.], 1914.

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**No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 30, 1914.

I learned from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Serbia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that did not imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favor of continuing an exchange of views with his Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible.

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**No. 107. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

I do not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government to the communication\* which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London, asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer yet. Today, in reply to an inquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he felt that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned.

\*See No. 84.

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise.

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**No. 108. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenseless while time was being utilized by other Powers; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, today perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor.

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request.

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**No. 109. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

I read to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of yesterday.\* His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official document.

His Excellency agreed.

\*See No. 101.

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**No. 110. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I learn from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna

between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilizing eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show good will in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations.

It is with great satisfaction that I have learned that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them.

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Serbia.

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#### No. 111. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I hope that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it his Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above.

**No. 112. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

According to information just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whole Russian Army and Fleet are being mobilized. Chancellor tells me that "Kriegsgefahr" will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilization is directed. Mobilization would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that "Kriegsgefahr" signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburg, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

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**No. 113. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilization.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

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**No. 114. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir E. Goschen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I still trust situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilization in Germany it becomes essential to his Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government is prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.

A similar request is being addressed to German (French Government). It is important to have an early answer.

**No. 115. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

In view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of her power her neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.

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**No. 116. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I have received your telegram of yesterday's date.\*

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development.

\*See No. 99.

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**No. 117. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

At 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency.

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilization of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilized.

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilization of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and inquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England.

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminate. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs tomorrow (Saturday) at 1 P. M. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances.

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any general mobilization of the Russian forces having taken place.

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**No. 118. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

I am informed by Count Forgach, Under Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilization, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilization was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilize, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Servia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognize such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation.

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Servia; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counseled Servia to yield to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace.

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**No. 119. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie**

London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

Sir:—M. Cambon referred today to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would



intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France it would decide the German attitude in favor of peace. I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that if France and Germany became involved in war we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion in the Cabinet today that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

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No. 120. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram

of 30th July\* with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.† He trusted it would meet with your approval:

Translation.—“If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if recognizing that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude.”

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier; it was, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilization which was already to progress.

M. Sazonof said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favorable and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this.

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain.

\* See No. 103. † See No. 97.

#### No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Received Aug. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Your telegram of 31st July.\*

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

He expressed himself very sympathetically toward your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of today; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilization against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilize at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in south as well.

\* See No. 111.

He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilization was only directed against Austria.

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favorable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continued discussions—and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilization had spoiled everything.

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**No. 122. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received Aug. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.\*

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.

I hope to see his Excellency tomorrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

In speaking to me today the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government.

\* See No. 114.

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**No. 123. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

Sir:—I told the German Ambassador today that the reply\* of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it,

\* See No. 122.

it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

**No. 124. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

On the receipt at 8:30 tonight of your telegram of this afternoon,\* I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10:30 tonight at the Elysée, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He took a note of the inquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make.

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilization of her army if Russia do not demobilize at once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by his Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is packing up.

\* See No. 114.

**No. 125. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

My immediately preceding telegram.\*

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to your inquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows:

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has

\* See No. 124.

been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs today.

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**No. 126. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, Aug. 1, 1914.

I have had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilization in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilization and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilize if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring immediate demobilization by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding.

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he had packed up.

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**No. 127. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received Aug. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, Aug. 1, 1914.

General mobilization of army and fleet.

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**No. 128. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received Aug. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, Aug. 1, 1914.

Belgian neutrality.

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday\* have been acted upon.

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of

\* See No. 115.

the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

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**No. 129. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received Aug. 2.)

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Luxemburg, Aug. 2, 1914.

The Luxemburg Minister of State has just received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways, which are leased to the Empire.

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**No. 130. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

We are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant ships.

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered.

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible.

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**No. 131. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any great power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension.

His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters.

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**No. 132. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

Following telegram from M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff of the 31st July communicated to me today:

Translation.—“(Urgent.) Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: ‘If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.’”

(Above communicated to all the Powers.)

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**No. 133. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

M. De Etter came today to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which are as follows:

“The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declares the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

“M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory.”

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)

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**No. 134. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received Aug. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, Aug. 1, 1914.

President of the republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilization had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilization; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilization, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilization will become necessary in self-defense, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the

French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilometers so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilizations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.

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**No. 135. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

Information reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that, though the situation has been changed by the mobilization of Russia, they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favorably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The understanding of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military countermeasures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilization.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government, also by Russian Government.

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**No. 136. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, Aug. 1, 1914.

Minister of War informed Military Attaché this afternoon that orders had been given at 3:40 for a general mobilization of the French Army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of "Kriegszustand," the Germans have called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he said, being tantamount to mobilization, is mobilization under another name.

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of ten kilom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilization is one for purely defensive purposes.



**No. 137. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914.

I saw the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandizement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the Sanjak.

Count Mensdorff called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg by Count Berchtold, and gave me the substance.

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that the "door had been banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburg, to the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary.

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff to the fact that this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburg had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary.

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**No. 138. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received Aug. 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, Aug. 1, 1914.

Your telegram of today.\*

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If, therefore, Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany.

\* See No. 131.

She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had, therefore, ordered mobilization, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war.

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**No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, Aug. 1, 1914.

My telegram of 31st July.\*

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress whatever was made.

In the evening M. Sazonof had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador, who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation toward a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Serbia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Serbia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment.

M. Sazonof informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Serbia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg; the former

\*See No. 120.

was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavors he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilization, and the mobilization of Germany had created a desperate situation.

M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July,\* had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first.

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilized on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.

\*See No. 120.

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**No. 140. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, Aug. 1, 1914.

The Minister of War again sent for the military attaché this evening, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom. which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavors to commit no provocative act.

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**No. 141. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, Aug. 1, 1914.

I am to be received tomorrow by Minister of Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia should demobilize within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilize if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that mobilization is too expensive to be kept for long. Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilization of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension

between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again today to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably colored his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs today on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany.

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**No. 142. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received Aug. 2.)

(Telegraphic)

Berlin, Aug. 1, 1914.

Orders have just been issued for the general mobilization of the navy and army, the first day of mobilization to be 2d August.

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**No. 143. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received Aug. 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, Aug. 1, 1914.

Detention of British merchant ship at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August\* acted on.

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

\* See No. 130.

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**No. 144. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, Aug. 2, 1914.

Secretary of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war.

**No. 145. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, Aug. 2, 1914.

My telegram of Aug. 1.\*

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favor to his Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.

\* See No. 143.

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**No. 146. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, Aug. 2, 1914.

The news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.

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**No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received August 2.)

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Luxemburg, Aug. 2, 1914.

I have the honor to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts:

On Sunday, the 2d August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly toward the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armored trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of his Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

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**No. 148. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 2, 1914.

After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum:

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations

against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of his Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding his Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany tomorrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament tomorrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

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#### No. 149. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 2, 1914.

Your telegram of 1st August.\*

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship *Sappho* at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar.

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August, † I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships cover also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified.

\* See No. 143. † See No. 130.

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#### No. 150. Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey

(Telegraphic.)

(Received August 3.)

Berlin, Aug. 3, 1914.

Your telegram of 2d August.\*

Detention of British ships at Hamburg.

No information available.

\* See No. 149.

**No. 151. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, Aug. 3, 1914.

French Government have offered through their Military Attaché the support of five French Army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been received today:

"We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take."

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**No. 152. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie**

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 3, 1914.

Sir:—On the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication:

"In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano replied:

"The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral."

In making this communication, M. Cambon was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the *casus fæderis* under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

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**No. 153. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914.

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

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**No. 154. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**

(Received Aug. 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.

German Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

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**No. 155. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914.

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

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**No. 156. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914.

I continue to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.

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**No. 157. German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky**

(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

Please dispell any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively



formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretense whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

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**No. 158. Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey**

(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.

Military Attaché has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that Liège has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed.

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**No. 159. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen**

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914.

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning\* be received here by 12 o'clock tonight. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that his Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

\* See No. 153.

## IV

### GERMANY'S "WHITE BOOK"

Given out by the German Foreign Office on Monday, August 3

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#### MEMORANDUM AND DOCUMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

Denkschrift und Aktenstücke zum Kriegsausbruch

On June 28 last the successor to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by the revolver shots of a member of a Servian band of conspirators. An investigation of the crime by Austro-Hungarian officials has revealed that the plot to take the life of the Archduke was planned and promoted in Belgrade with the co-operation of official Servian individuals and was carried out with weapons from the Servian Government depot.

This crime was bound to open the eyes of the whole civilized world, not only with regard to the object of Servian politics as relating to the existence and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also with regard to the criminal means that the Pan-Servian propaganda did not hesitate to employ in order to attain these ends. The ultimate object of these policies was to revolutionize gradually and finally to bring about a separation of the southwestern region of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy from that empire and unite it with Servia.

The repeated and formal declarations of Servia to Austria-Hungary to bring about good neighborly relations did not change this trend of Servian politics in the least. For the third time in the course of the last six years Servia has brought Europe to the verge of a world war in this manner. She could only do this because she believed herself supported by Russia in her endeavors.

As a result of the developments of the year 1908 growing out of the Turkish revolution, Russian policies had begun to organize a league of the Balkan States directed against the existence of Turkey, under Russian patronage. This alliance of the Balkan States which was successful in crowding Turkey out of her European possessions in 1911, came to grief over the question of the disposition of the spoils. Russian policy was not, however, frightened by this failure. It was the idea of Russian statesmen that there should be formed a new Balkan League under Russian patronage, whose activities should be directed this time not against Turkey, which had been driven from the Balkans, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The idea was that Servia

should cede to Bulgaria the section of Macedonia that she had won in the last Balkan war and offset the loss by the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the expense of the Monarchy of the Danube. For this purpose Bulgaria, by her isolation, was to be made pliable, Rumania, as the result of a propaganda undertaken with the aid of France, was to be chained to Russia, and Serbia was to be referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In view of these circumstances Austria had to admit that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action. The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Serbia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our approval. We were fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Serbia would bring Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with our duty as an ally. However, recognizing the vital interests of Austria-Hungary which were at stake, we could neither advise our ally to a compliance that would have been inconsistent with her dignity, nor could we deny her our support in this great hour of need. We were all the more unable to do this inasmuch as our interests also were seriously threatened as a result of the continuous Servian agitation. If Serbia, with the help of Russia and France, had been allowed to imperil the existence of the neighboring monarchy any longer, this would lead to the gradual downfall of Austria and would result in submission to Slavic sway under the Russian sceptre, thus making the position of the Germanic race in Central Europe untenable. A morally weakened Austria breaking down as the result of the advance of Russian Pan-Slavism would no longer be an ally on whom we could count and upon whom we could rely, such as we need in view of the attitude of our eastern and western neighbors, which has constantly grown more threatening. We therefore gave Austria an entirely free hand in her action against Serbia. We have taken no part in the preparations.

Austria chose the way, laying before the Servian Government in detail the immediate relation between the murder and the general Servian movement, not only tolerated by the Servian Government, but supported by it, which an investigation of the murder at Serajevo had established. At the same time Serbia was asked by Austria to put an absolute end to these activities and to allow Austria to punish the guilty parties. Austria demanded as a guarantee for the carrying out of the proceedings participation in the investigation on Servian territory and the definite dissolution of the various Pan-Servian societies carrying on an agitation against Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government set a time limit of forty-eight hours for the unconditional acceptance of her terms. One day after the Austro-Hungarian note had been handed to it the Servian Government began mobilization. When, after the expiration of the time limit, the Servian Government made a reply which, while satisfying the demands of Austria-Hungary on certain points, made known emphatically with regard to the essential ones its intention to refuse the just demands of the monarchy by means of temporizing and the introduction of new

negotiations, Austria broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia without having recourse to further negotiations or allowing herself to be put off by Serbian assurances, the value of which she knows well enough—to her sorrow.

From that moment Austria was actually in a state of war with Serbia, which was publicly proclaimed by means of the official declaration of war on the 28th of the month.

From the very beginning of the conflict we took the stand that this was an affair of Austria which she alone would have to bring to a decision with Serbia. We have therefore devoted our entire efforts to localizing the war and to convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary was compelled to take justified defensive methods and appeal to arms. We took the stand emphatically that no civilized nation had the right in this struggle against lack of culture [Unkultur] and criminal political morality to prevent Austria from acting and to take away the just punishment from Serbia. We instructed our representatives abroad in that sense.

At the same time the Austro-Hungarian Government informed the Russian Government that her (Austria's) move against Serbia was entirely a defensive measure designed to put a stop to Serbian agitation, but that Austria-Hungary was compelled by necessity to demand guarantees of a continued friendly attitude on the part of Serbia toward the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Austria-Hungary, the note to Russia stated, had no intention of bringing about a disturbance of the balance of power in the Balkans. Both the French and the English Governments, replying to our explanation that the German Government wished and was trying to localize the conflict, promised to work in the same interest. In the meantime these efforts did not succeed in preventing Russia's interference in the Austro-Serbian disagreement.

The Russian Government issued an official communiqué on July 24, according to which it would be impossible for Russia to remain indifferent in the Serbian-Austrian conflict. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sazonof, made this position known to the Imperial Ambassador, Count Pourtales. On the afternoon of July 26 the Austro-Hungarian Government again explained through its Ambassador in St. Petersburg that Austria-Hungary had no plans of conquest, but only wished to have peace at last on her frontiers. In the course of the same day the first reports of Russian mobilization reached Berlin. On the evening of the 26th the Imperial Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were directed to call the attention of the English, French, and Russian Governments energetically to the danger of this Russian mobilization. After Austria-Hungary had officially declared to Russia that she did not seek the acquisition of any territory in Serbia, the decision for world peace lay entirely in St. Petersburg. The same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was directed to make the following statement to the Russian Government:

The military preparatory measures of Russia will compel us to take counter-action which must consist in the mobilization of the army. Mobilization, however, indicates war. Inasmuch as we know France's obligations toward Russia, this mobilization would be directed simultaneously against Russia and France.

We cannot assume that Russia wishes to let loose such a European war. Inasmuch as Austria-Hungary will not impair the continuance of the Servian Kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can adopt a policy of waiting. We shall be all the more able to support Russia's wish not to allow the integrity of the Servian Kingdom to be called into question, since Austria does not call this integrity into question herself. It will be easy to find a basis of agreement in the further course of the affair.

On July 27 the Russian Minister for War, Suchomlinof, gave the German Military Attaché his word of honor that no mobilization order had as yet been issued. He said that for the present preparatory measures were being taken, no horses being levied and no reservists being called in. In case Austria-Hungary were to cross the Servian boundary, the military districts facing Austria, those of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, would be mobilized. Under no circumstances would there be a mobilization of the districts lying on the German front: St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. In answer to the Military Attaché's question as to what was the object of mobilization against Austria-Hungary, the Russian War Minister shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. Thereupon the Military Attaché indicated that measures to mobilize against Austria-Hungary were also decidedly threatening to Germany. In the following days reports concerning the Russian mobilization followed each other in quick succession. Among these were reports concerning preparations on the German border, such as the declaration of a state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison. On July 27 the first reports of preparatory measures by France arrived. The Fourteenth Corps discontinued its manoeuvres and returned to garrison duty.

In the meantime we continued to exert our most energetic influence on the Cabinets to insure the localization of the conflict.

On the 26th Sir Edward Grey had suggested that the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia be laid before a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy, with himself presiding over the sessions. To this suggestion we replied that, while we approved his tender, we could not take part in such a conference because we could not call upon Austria to appear before a European court in her controversy with Servia.

France agreed to Sir Edward Grey's proposal, but it was finally brought to naught because Austria, as was to be expected, held herself aloof.

True to our conviction that an act of mediation could not take into consideration the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an Austro-Hungarian affair, but would have to take into consideration only the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our efforts to bring about an understanding between these two powers. We were also willing, after declining the conference idea, to transmit a further proposal by Sir Edward Grey to Vienna, in which he urged that Austria-Hungary either agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations. The Austro-Hungarian Government, in full appreciation of our mediatory activity, replied to this proposal that, coming as it did after the opening of hostilities, it was too late.

In spite of this we continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy. Unluckily, all of these mediatory acts were soon overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France. On July 29 the Russian Government officially announced in Berlin that it had mobilized four army districts. At the same time additional reports reached us of rapidly progressing military preparations by France on land and sea. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg had a conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning which he reported as follows by telegraph:

The Minister tried to persuade me to agree in behalf of my Government to a conversation of four parties to devise means of moving Austria-Hungary to give up those demands touching on the sovereignty of Servia. While I agreed to a complete transmission of the conversation, I took the stand that, since Russia had decided on the ominous step of mobilization, it was difficult for me to exchange any opinions on this subject, and it almost seemed impossible to do so. I said that what Russia now demanded of us in respect to Austria-Hungary was the same thing of which Austria-Hungary was accused regarding Servia—a usurpation of the rights of sovereignty; that Austria-Hungary had promised to be considerate of Russian interests by declaring her territorial disinterestedness, a great concession on the part of a nation waging war. For this reason, I said, an opportunity should be given the Dual Monarchy to settle her dispute with Servia alone. There would be time enough to come back to the subject of safeguarding Servian sovereignty when peace terms were to be concluded.

I added very earnestly that at the present moment the Austro-Servian affair was secondary to the danger of a European conflagration, and I made every effort to show the Minister the greatness of this danger.

It was impossible to change Sazonof's mind on the point that Russia could not desert Servia now.

Similarly the Military Attaché at St. Petersburg reported by telegraph on the 29th as follows, regarding an interview with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army:

The Chief of the General Staff asked me to call and informed me that he had just come from His Majesty. He stated that he had been instructed by the Minister for War to assure me again that everything had remained the same as it had been explained to me by the Minister two days ago. He offered me a written confirmation and gave me his word of honor in the most formal manner that mobilization had begun nowhere, that is to say, not a single man or horse had been levied up to that hour, three o'clock in the afternoon. He stated that he could not answer for the future, but he could declare most emphatically that no mobilization was desired by His Majesty in the districts touching

on our boundary. However, many reports have reached here and also Warsaw and Vilna of the levying of reservists in various parts of the empire. I therefore told the General that I was confronted with a riddle as the result of his announcements to me. On his word as an officer he repeated, however, that such reports were untrue; that a false alarm may have been raised here and there.

In view of the positive, numerous reports before me of actual levying, I am compelled to consider the conversation as an attempt to mislead us with regard to the extent of the measures that have already been taken.

Inasmuch as the Russian Government, in reply to the several inquiries regarding the reasons for its threatening attitude, several times alluded to the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had not yet begun any conversations in St. Petersburg, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, at our request, was directed on July 29 to begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof. Count Szapary was authorized to make known to the Russian Minister the contents of the note to Servia which had been, as it were, overtaken by the declaration of war, and to receive any suggestions that might still come from the Russian side, as well as to discuss with Sazonof all questions touching directly on the Austro-Russian relations.

Shoulder to shoulder with England we continued to work without cessation for mediation, and supported every suggestion in Vienna which we believed showed hope of the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. As late as the 30th we transmitted an English proposal to Vienna which established this basis of negotiation, that Austria-Hungary, after succeeding in marching into Servia, should dictate her terms there. We had to assume that Russia would accept this basis.

While these efforts of ours for mediation, supported by English diplomacy, were being continued with increasing urgency in the time from July 29 to the 31st, there constantly came new and increasing reports concerning Russian mobilization measures. The assembling of troops on the East Prussian border and the declaration of a state of war in all important places on the Russian western boundary no longer left any doubt of the fact that Russian mobilization was actively going on against us, while at the same time all such measures were denied anew on word of honor to our representative at St. Petersburg. Even before the reply to the last English-German mediation proposal, the basis of which must have been known in St. Petersburg, could reach Berlin from Vienna, Russia ordered a general mobilization. On the same day an exchange of telegrams took place between his Majesty the Kaiser and King and Czar Nicholas in which his Majesty called the Czar's attention to the threatening character of the Russian mobilization and to the continuance of his own activity as mediator.

On July 31 the Czar directed the following telegram to his Majesty:

I thank you from my heart for your mediation, which permits a gleam of hope that everything can yet be settled peaceably. It is a technical impossibility for us to halt our military preparations which became necessary through Austria's mobilization. We are

far from desirous of war. So long as the negotiations continue with Austria concerning Serbia, my troops will not undertake any challenging action. I solemnly pledge you my word as to that. I am trusting in the grace of God with all my might and hope for the success of your mediation in Vienna, for the welfare of our countries and for the peace of Europe. Your sincerely devoted

NICHOLAS.

To this his Majesty the Kaiser replied:

Upon your appeal to my friendship and your plea for my help, I have undertaken a mediatory action between your Government and the Austro-Hungarian Government. While this negotiation was under way your troops were mobilized against Austria-Hungary, which is allied with me, as a consequence of which my mediation was almost made illusory, as I have already informed you. Notwithstanding this, I continued it. Now I am in receipt of reliable reports of serious preparations for war on my eastern boundary also. Responsibility for the safety of my empire compels me to take counter defensive measures. I have carried my efforts for the maintenance of world peace to the utmost limit. It is not I that bear the responsibility for the calamity that now threatens the entire civilized world. Yet at this moment it lies in your power to stave it off. No one threatens the honor and might of Russia, which might have awaited the result of my mediation. The friendship for you and your empire which was bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed has always been sacred to me, and I have been faithful to Russia when she was hard pressed, especially in her last war. It is still possible for you to maintain the peace of Europe if Russia will decide to put a stop to the military measures that threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Even before this telegram reached its destination the mobilization of the entire Russian fighting force, which had been ordered in the forenoon of the same day, openly directed against us, was in full swing. The Czar's telegram, however, was sent at 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

After the mobilization became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was ordered on the afternoon of July 31 to advise the Russian Government that Germany had declared a state of war as a counter move to the mobilization of the Russian Army and Navy, which would have to be followed by mobilization unless Russia ceased her military preparations against Germany and Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and so advise Germany.

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador at Paris was directed to request an explanation from the French Government within eighteen hours as to whether, in the case of a Russo-German war, France would remain neutral.

The Russian Government destroyed the painstaking mediatory work of the European State Chancelleries, shortly before its successful outcome, by her mobilization, which endangered the safety of the German Empire.



The mobilization measures, concerning the seriousness of which to the Russian Government no doubt was allowed to arise from the beginning, together with her continued denial, show clearly that Russia desired the war.

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered the message that had been given to him for Mr. Sazonof on July 31 at midnight.

After the expiration of the time limit set for Russia without the receipt of an answer to our inquiry, his Majesty the Emperor and King ordered the mobilization of the entire German Army and the Imperial Navy at 5 P. M. on Aug. 1. In the meantime the imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to hand a declaration of war to the Russian Government in case no favorable reply was issued before the expiration of the time limit. However, before a report regarding the execution of this order arrived, Russian troops crossed our border and advanced on German territory, namely, as early as the afternoon of Aug. 1.

By this move Russia began the war against us.

In the meantime the Imperial Ambassador at Paris put the question that he had been ordered to present before the French Cabinet at 7 P. M. on July 31.

To this the French Prime Minister made an ambiguous and unsatisfactory reply at 1 o'clock in the afternoon of Aug. 1. This does not give a clear picture of the French position, since it was limited to the statement that France would do what her interests seemed to warrant. A few hours later, at 5 in the afternoon, the complete mobilization of the entire French Army and Navy was ordered.

On the morning of the following day France opened hostilities.

Concluded on Aug. 2, noon.

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### The Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia

From the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, July 25, 1914.

Berlin, July 24.

The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade at 6 o'clock last night handed to the Servian Government a verbal note with the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government. In the note the answer is requested by 6 P. M., July 25. It reads as follows:

*Already printed, see pages 5-7.*

The Fremdenblatt writes, among other things, as follows: "The crime of Serajevo has revealed to the whole world the dangers that threaten us, and has directed our attention to the pressing need of insuring quiet and safety to ourselves at any cost. The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade today made known to the Servian Government the demands which we must make to it today. It is the result of long, careful consideration and does not go any further than absolutely necessary. We must insist on the demands as they stand; for this is a matter of underground passages extending from Serbia directly to the heart of our South Slavic territories. Conditions that we cannot allow to continue have made themselves apparent on the threshold of our house as a result of the encroachment

of the Pan-Servian idea. Serbia has covered herself with a network of societies which, with the pretext of fostering culture, preach the doctrine of hatred of us throughout the country. Emissaries are sent out to Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia to incite the populace to revolt and to picture to them an imminent union of those territories with the Servian Kingdom. The Servian Government, in spite of its emphatic declaration, has done nothing to stop this movement; its tolerance has had the effect of silent consent. Anything that has been done has been done only for appearances. There are many persons of high military rank, or professors or teachers in the service of the State, who are among the leaders of these societies. If one group hopes to attain its end by means of pacts and war, the others express their conviction that a terroristic and revolutionary stage must precede the diplomatic and military action. The event of Serajevo has demonstrated that this plan of campaign is being waged against us with terrible emphasis. It has been proved that the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife was carried out with the support of officials of the kingdom. We have to deal with an irreconcilable, bitterly hostile movement, which shows itself in most varied forms, but which, in its entirety, keeps our border populace in a state of excitement, shatters the confidence of the various races in our monarchy as to our ability to maintain peace with the outside world, and is the main point for the beginning of all efforts against us, and causes much precious blood to flow on our territories. The results of this agitation have frequently been felt in our economic life. Thousands of careers have been blasted as a result of the alarming crises following the constantly recurring Pan-Servian scare. Were we to endure all this without stepping in to take decided action against it, the same agitators who continually, for the sake of rhetorical effect, accuse us of the misuse of power, would call this a sign of weakness, lack of will, and fear. They would state that we do not dare to defend ourselves, and in that way they would find new supporters and would feel encouraged to a doubly strong attack. While we are making our will felt, we are bringing the Servian people themselves to a realization of their position. They will see that they have been deceived, that the movement for a greater Serbia will break against an iron wall, that the monarchy is determined to spurn them. The feeling that we have to deal with a condition that has become unbearable, that a stop must be put to it, is so strong among our people that complaints concerning the long delay in dealing with the situation are getting louder. This impatience and criticism can be understood. But the Austro-Hungarian Government did not wish to act in anger, not without the most careful testing of every circumstance, not without making absolutely certain what demands must be made. Serbia has been allowed a brief time in which to comply with our demands. We do not wish to lengthen the period of the crisis that weighs down our economic life and is making all Europe uneasy. We want to adjust an untenable relation as quickly as possible, convince public opinion in Serbia of our determination, and finally come to a settlement. We hope that Serbia will bow to the desires that we have expressed within the time set. There is no more reason to doubt our determined will to maintain our position under all circumstances than to doubt our sincere wish that better relations may be developed in the future between Serbia and Austria-Hungary."

VIENNA, July 24.—The newspapers declare that the note to Serbia is the beginning of a defense and is not an attack, that it shows the strong will of the monarchy, but demands nothing from Serbia except what should have been done long ago for the maintenance of its respect before Europe. The entire press expresses the hope that Serbia, by prompt acceptance of Austria-Hungary's terms, will remove the suspicion of partnership with the murderers, and that she will be far-sighted enough to choose peace and not war.

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### Austria-Hungary and the Servian Note

From the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, July 29, 1914.

VIENNA, July 27.—The note of the Royal Servian Government of July 25, 1914, reads as follows:

The Royal Government has received the notification of the Austro-Hungarian Government of the 10th inst., and is convinced that its answer will remove every misunderstanding that threatens to disturb the pleasant neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Servian Kingdom.

The Royal Government is certain that in dealing with the great neighboring monarchy those protests have under no pretext been renewed which formerly were made both in Skupshtina and in explanations and negotiations of responsible representatives of the State and which, through the declaration of the Servian Government of March 18, 1909, were settled; furthermore, that since that time none of the various successive Governments of the kingdom, nor any of its officers, has made an attempt to change the political and legal conditions set up in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Royal Government is certain that the Austro-Hungarian Government has made no representations of any kind along this line except in the case of a textbook concerning which the Austro-Hungarian Government received an entirely satisfactory reply. Serbia, during the Balkan crisis, gave evidence in numerous cases of her pacific and temperate policies, and it will be thanks to Serbia alone and the sacrifices that she alone made in the interest of European peace if that peace continue.

On this the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy comments:

The Royal Servian Government limits itself to the statement that since it made the declaration of March 18, 1909, no effort has been made by the Servian Government or its officers to alter the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thereby it consciously and willfully evades the grounds on which we base our course, since we did not make the claim that it and its officials had undertaken anything of an official nature along this line.

Our grievance rather is this, that it failed to suppress movements directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy in spite of the pledges made in the note in question.

Its pledge consisted of this, that the entire trend of its policies was to be changed and pleasant, neighborly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy brought about; not merely to refrain from officially taking up the question of Bosnia's belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Servian note thereupon continues:

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for utterances of a private character such as newspaper articles and the peaceful work of societies, utterances which are quite ordinary in almost all countries and which are not generally under State control, especially since the Royal Government, in the solution of a great number of questions that came up between Servia and Austria-Hungary, showed much consideration as a result of which most of these questions were settled in the best interests of the progress of the two neighboring countries.

Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

The contention of the Royal Servian Government that utterances of the press and the activities of societies have a private character and are not under the control of the State is contrary to the practice of modern States, even under the freest interpretation of the rights of the press and societies, which are of public legal character and both subject to State supervision. Moreover, Servian practice is to exercise such control. The charge against the Servian Government is that it has entirely failed to inspect its press and societies whose acts hostile to Austria-Hungary were known to it.

The Servian note continues:

The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised to hear the contention that Servian subjects had taken part in the preparations for the murder committed in Serajevo. It had hoped to be invited to co-operate in the investigations following this crime and was prepared, in order to prove the entire correctness of its acts, to proceed against all persons concerning whom it had received information.

Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

This contention is incorrect. The Servian Government had been carefully advised as to certain definite persons who were suspected, and it was not only in the position but bound by its internal laws to begin an action spontaneously. It did nothing at all along these lines.

Servia's note continues:

In conformity with the wish of the Austro-Hungarian Government, the Royal Government is prepared to turn over to the court, regardless of station or rank, any Servian subject concerning whose participation in the crime at Serajevo proofs may be given to it. The Government pledges itself especially to publish on the first page of the official organ of July 26 the following declaration:

"The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda that may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all efforts designed ultimately to sever territory from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the sad consequences of these criminal machinations."

### Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

Our demand read as follows: "The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda that is directed against Austria-Hungary \* \* \* ." The change made by the Royal Servian Government in the declaration demanded by us infers that such a propaganda against Austria-Hungary does not exist or that it is unknown to the Royal Government. This formula is not sincere, and conceals something in order that the Servian Government later may reserve an avenue of escape, saying that in its declaration it did not disavow the existence of the present propaganda, and did not recognize it as inimical to the monarchy, whereupon it could mislead further to the contention that it would not be pledged to suppress a propaganda like the present one.

### Servia's note continues:

The Royal Government regrets that, in accordance with advices from the Austro-Hungarian Government, certain Servian officers and functionaries are taking an active part in the present propaganda and that they have thereby jeopardized the pleasant neighborly relations to the maintenance of which the Royal Government was formally pledged by the declaration of March 31, 1909.

The Government (what follows here is similar to the text demanded).

### Comment of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

The formal declaration demanded by us was as follows: "The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries \* \* \* took part in \* \* \* ." Also in this choice of words and in the additional clause "in accordance with advices from the Austro-Hungarian Government," it is shown that the Servian Government is carrying out the object indicated above—to allow itself free rein in the future.

### Servia's note continues:

The Royal Government further pledges itself:

1. To introduce a provision in the press law on the occasion of the next regular session of the Skupshtina, according to which instigations to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as well as any publication directed in general against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary, shall be punished severely.

The Government pledges itself, on the occasion of the coming revision of the Constitution, to add to Article XXII, a clause permitting the confiscation of publications, the confiscation of which, under the present Article XXII of the Constitution, would be impossible.

### Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

We had demanded:

"1. The suppression of all publications that arouse people to hatred and contempt for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and whose tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy."

We thus wished to oblige Servia to take measures for having such attacks

in the press cease in future; we wished, therefore, to be sure that we had won certain success in this direction.

Instead, Serbia offers to make certain laws that may lead to the above result, to wit:

(a) A law by which the individuals may be punished for above-mentioned statements of the press hostile to the monarchy. This is nothing to us, especially, as it is well known that the punishment of individuals for press misdemeanors is possible only in very rare cases, and, under a correspondingly lax handling of such a law, even these few would not be punished. Thus this is a suggestion which in no wise answers our demand, and therefore does not offer us the slightest guarantee of the result desired by us.

(b) An addition to Article XXII of the Constitution to the effect that confiscation be allowed—a suggestion that likewise must fail to satisfy us, since the existence of such a law in Serbia is of no use to us. What would be of use would be the promise of the Government to enforce it, which promise is not made to us.

Therefore these suggestions are thoroughly unsatisfactory, all the more so as they are of an evasive nature, since we are not told within what space of time these laws will be enacted, and since if the enactment of the laws should be refused by the Skupstina—to say nothing of the possible resignation of the Government—all would remain as it was.

Servia's note continues:

2. The Government possesses no proof—and the note of the Austro-Hungarian Government provides it with none—that the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and other similar associations have up to the present committed any criminal acts through any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Austro-Hungarian Government and dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society, as well as all societies that may work against Austria-Hungary.

Observation of the Imperial and Royal Government:

The anti-monarchical propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and the associations affiliated with it fills all public life in Serbia; it is therefore a quite unreliable statement on the part of the Servian Government to maintain that it knows nothing about this society.

To say nothing of the fact that the demand made by us is not entirely granted, since we furthermore demanded:

That the means of propaganda of these associations should be confiscated.

That the reorganization of the dissolved associations under other names and in other forms should be prevented.

Concerning these two points the Belgrade Government preserves complete silence, so that we have no assurance, in the partial agreement given us, that an end will be put to the anti-Austrian associations, especially of the "Narodna Odbrana," by their dissolution.

Servia's note continues:

3. The Royal Servian Government agrees to eliminate forthwith from public education in Serbia everything that might help the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, provided that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives it actual proof of this propaganda.

Observation of the Imperial and Royal Government:

Upon this point also the Servian Government demands proof that, in the public instruction courses of Serbia, there is an anti-Austrian propaganda,

although it must be aware that the books employed in the Servian schools contain such matter, and that a great part of the Servian teachers are in the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated associations.

Moreover, in this case also, the Servian Government has not met a part of our demands, since, in its text, it left out this addition desired by us, "as well as the body of teachers and the means of teaching are concerned"—an addition which clearly shows where the anti-Austrian propaganda in the Servian schools is to be sought.

Servia's note continues:

4. The Royal Government is also ready to discharge from military and civil service such officers—provided it is proved against them by legal investigation—who have implicated themselves in acts directed against the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; the Government expects that, for the purpose of instituting proceedings, the Austro-Hungarian Government will impart the names of these officers and employes and the acts of which they are accused.

Observation of the Imperial and Royal Government:

In view of the fact that the Royal Servian Government makes the discharge of the officers and employes in question from military and civil service dependent on whether they are found guilty after trial, its accession to our demand is limited to those cases where such persons have committed acts laying them open to legal penalties. Since, however, we demand the elimination of those officers and employes who are making an anti-Austrian propaganda, which in Servia is not usually punishable by law, it would seem that in this case also our demands have not been met.

Servia's note continues:

5. The Royal Servian Government must confess that it is not quite clear as to the sense and scope of the desire of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the effect that the royal Servian Government bind itself to allow the co-operation within its territory of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government, but it nevertheless declares itself willing to permit such co-operation as might be in conformity with international law and criminal procedure, as well as with friendly neighborly relations.

Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

International law has as little to do with this question as criminal procedure. The question is purely one of national policing, to be solved by special agreement. Servia's statement is, therefore, incomprehensible and, on account of its vague form, would give rise to insurmountable difficulties if an endeavor were made to arrange the agreement.

Servia's note continues:

6. The Royal Government naturally holds itself bound to institute an investigation against all such persons as were concerned in the plot of June 15-28, or are supposed to have been concerned in it, and are on Servian soil. As to the co-operation of special delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government in this investigation, the Servian Government cannot accept such

co-operation, since this would be a violation of the laws and criminal procedure. However, in individual cases, information as to the progress of the investigation might be given the Austro-Hungarian delegates.

#### Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

Our demand was perfectly clear and not to be misunderstood. We wished:

(1) The institution of a legal investigation against those implicated in the plot.

(2) That Austro-Hungarian representatives should take part in the investigation, ("recherche," in contradistinction to "enquête judiciaire.")

(3) We did not desire that Austro-Hungarian representatives take part in the Servian legal proceedings; all we wished them to do was to co-operate in the police preliminaries, and help get together and corroborate the evidence for the investigation. If the Servian Government misunderstands us it does so purposely, since the difference between "enquête judiciaire" and the simple "recherches" must certainly be plain to it. Since it wished to be free of all control in the proceedings to be instituted, which, if properly conducted, would have results highly undesirable for it, and as it has no loophole for plausibly declining our co-operation in the police proceedings (analogous cases for such police intervention exist in great number) it has taken a ground that gives to its refusal the appearance of right and to our demand the stamp of impossibility.

#### The Servian note continues:

7. On the very evening on which your note arrived the Royal Government caused the arrest of Major Voislav Tankosic. But, regarding Milan Ciganovic, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and who was employed until June 15 (as candidate) in the Department of Railroads, it has not been possible to arrest this man up to now, for which reason a warrant has been issued against him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government is requested, in order that the investigation may be made as soon as possible, to make known in the specified form what grounds of suspicion exist, and the proofs of guilt collected at the investigation in Serajevo.

#### Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

This answer is insincere. Ciganovic, according to our investigation, went on a furlough three days after the crime, when it became known that he was concerned in the plot, and repaired to Ribari in the service of the Prefect of Police of Belgrade. So that it is incorrect to say that, between June 15 and 28, Ciganovic was already out of the Servian service. To this must be added that the Prefect of Police of Belgrade, who himself had brought about the departure of Ciganovic, and who knew where the latter was, declared in an interview that there was no man of the name of Milan Ciganovic in Belgrade.

#### The Servian note continues:

8. The Servian Government will increase the severity and scope of its measures against the smuggling of arms and explosives.

It goes without saying that it will at once start an investigation and mete out severe punishment to the frontier officials of the Sabac-Loznica line who failed in their duty and allowed those responsible for the crime to cross the frontier.



9. The Royal Government is willing to give explanations of the statements made in interviews by its officials in Serbia and foreign countries after the crime, and, which, according to the Austro-Hungarian Government, were anti-Austrian, as soon as the said Government indicates where these statements were made and provides proofs that such statements were actually made by the said officials. The Royal Government will itself take steps to collect the necessary proofs and means of transmission for this purpose.

#### Observation of the Austro-Hungarian Government:

The Royal Servian Government must have perfectly good knowledge of these interviews. If it requires that the Austro-Hungarian Government provide all sorts of details about these interviews and demands a regular investigation, it shows that it has no desire really to accede to this demand.

#### The Servian note continues:

10. The Royal Government will, in so far as this has not already occurred in this note, inform the Austro-Hungarian Government of the taking of the measures concerning the foregoing matters, as soon as such measures have been ordered and carried out.

The Royal Servian Government is of the opinion that it is mutually advantageous not to hinder the settlement of this question, and therefore, in case the Austro-Hungarian Government should not consider itself satisfied with this answer, it is ready as always to accept a peaceful solution, either by referring the decision of this question to the international tribunal at The Hague or by leaving it to the great powers who co-operated in the preparation of the explanation given by the Servian Government on the 18th-31st March, 1909.

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#### Annex 1 A. From the Austro-Hungarian Material

VIENNA, July 27.—The "dossier" mentioned in the Austro-Hungarian circular note to the foreign Embassies concerning the Servian dispute is made public today.

In this memorial, attention is called to the fact that the movement originating in Serbia, which has as an object to tear away the southern portions of Austria-Hungary from the monarchy and unite them to Serbia, strikes far back into the past. This propaganda, always the same in purpose, changing only in means and intensity, reached its climax at the time of the annexation crisis, and came out openly at that time with its aims. While, on the one side, the entire Servian press preached for war against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, associations were formed—to say nothing of other means of propaganda—which prepared such warfare, among which the Narodna Odbrana was the most important. Originating in a revolutionary committee, this association became entirely dependent on the Servian Foreign Office, under the direction of statesmen and officers, among them Gen. Jankovic and former Minister Ivanovic. Among the

founders are also Major Oja Tankovic and Milan Pribicevic. This association had as an object the formation and equipment of bodies of volunteers for the coming war against Austria-Hungary. In addition to the memorial, a quotation is given from the association's official organ, which bears the same name, Narodna Odbrana, and is issued at the association's headquarters, wherein, in several articles, the activities and aim of this society are set forth. Therein it is stated that part of the main task of the Narodna Odbrana is to effect union between its brothers far and near on the other side of the border, and with all the rest of our friends in the world.

Austria is mentioned as the first and greatest enemy. Just as the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of war with Austria, it also preaches a holy truth about our national situation. The closing chapter contains an appeal to the Government and people of Serbia to prepare in every way for the struggle which the annexation foreshadowed.

The memorial tells of the Narodna Odbrana's activities at that time, as set forth in a statement of a komitadji raised by the association; it maintained a school under the direction of two of its principal members, of whom one was Tankovic, for the instruction of bands of men—schools which Gen. Jankovic and Capt. Milan Pribicevic inspected regularly. Furthermore, the komitadjis were instructed in shooting, bomb-throwing, laying of mines, blowing up of railway bridges, &c. After the solemn declaration of the Servian Government in 1909 it looked as if the end of this organization also had come. But expectations in this direction have not only not been fulfilled, but the propaganda was continued by the Servian press. The memorial adduces as an instance of this how the attack on the Bosnian local chief, Varesanin, was utilized in the public prints, which extolled the man responsible for it as a national hero and glorified his deed. These sheets were not only circulated in Serbia, but were smuggled into Austria-Hungary along well-organized secret channels.

Under the same leadership as when it was founded, the Narodna Odbrana recently became the centre of an agitation to which the Schützembund, including 762 associations, a Sokolbund, with 3,500 members, and various other societies belonged.

Appearing in the disguise of a culture association, concerned only with the intellectual and physical development of the population of Serbia as well as with its material strengthening, the Narodna Odbrana betrays its genuine reorganized programme in the above-mentioned quotations from its official organ, in which "the holy truth" is preached—that it is an inevitable necessity to carry on this fight of extermination against Austria, the first and greatest enemy, with rifle and cannon, and to prepare the people in every way for the struggle to liberate the oppressed territories where many millions of enslaved brothers are suffering. The appeals quoted in the memorial, and addresses of a like character, cast a light on the manifold foreign activities of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated societies, which consist of lecture tours and taking part in celebrations of Bosnian societies, at which members for the above-mentioned Servian union are openly recruited. At present an investigation is being made of the fact that the Sokol societies of Serbia intended to unite with similar societies in Austria-Hungary in a union kept secret up to now. Men of trust and missionaries stirred up adults and unthinking youths. Thus

Milan Pribicevic persuaded former Honved officers and a lieutenant of gendarmes to leave army service in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy under serious circumstances. In the schools where teachers are educated an agitation of wide scope was developed. The wished for fight against the Austro-Hungarian empire was also prepared militarily to the point that Servian emissaries were commissioned to destroy means of transportation, etc., and to kindle revolts and panics, in case of the outbreak of hostilities. All this is told in a special inclosure.

The memorial tells further of the connection between this activity of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated organizations with the attempts against Cuvaj, the Royal Commissioner at Agram, in July, 1912; with the attempt of Dojcic in Agram in 1913 against Skerlec, and the unsuccessful attempt of Schäfer on May 20 in the Agram Theatre. It then takes up the connection with the attack on the Crown Prince and his wife, and how even children in school are poisoned with thoughts of the Narodna Odbrana, and how the conspirators, with the aid of Pribicevic and Dacic, secured the weapons for the attack. Here special stress is laid on the part played by Major Tankosic, who delivered the weapons for the murder, as also on that of a certain Ciganovic, a former comitadji, now employed on the Servian railways at Belgrade, who as early as 1909 figured as a graduate of the school for instructing bands of men maintained by the Narodna Odbrana of that time. Furthermore, it is told how bombs and arms were secretly smuggled into Bosnia, which leaves no doubt that this is a well-prepared and often utilized road for the secret aims of the Narodna.

One inclosure contains a quotation from the minutes of the court-martial in Serajevo concerning the investigation of the attack on the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife. According to this, Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez, Crupilovic, and Papovic appear as having confessed that they, in company with the fugitive Mehmedbasic, organized a plot for the murder of the Archduke and that they kept watch on him for this purpose. Cabrinovic is said to have confessed that he threw the bomb and that Gabrilo Princip carried out the attempt with the Browning pistol. Both men acknowledged that in doing the deed they premeditated murder. The other parts of the inclosure contain further statements of the guilty parties before the Judge conducting the investigation as to the origin of the plot and whence the bombs came. These were manufactured for military purposes and, judging from the way they were originally packed, came from the Servian arsenal at Kragujewac. Finally, the inclosure gives information as to the transportation of the three conspirators and their arms from Servia to Bosnia. From further testimony of witnesses it appears that a subject of Austria-Hungary wished to give information to the Austro-Hungarian Consulate at Belgrade that he suspected a plan existed for an attempt on the life of the Archduke during his stay in Bosnia. It is alleged that this man was prevented from lodging this information by Belgrade police officials, who arrested him on some empty pretext just as he was entering the Consulate. It is furthermore stated that the testimony of witnesses shows that the said police officials had knowledge of the attempt planned. Since these statements have not yet been investigated no opinion can be formed for the present as to their validity. In the inclosure with the memorial it is stated: Before the reception hall of the Servian Ministry of War there are four allegorical pictures of

which three are representations of Servian victories, while the fourth shows the realization of Servia's hostile dreams against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Over a landscape that is partly mountains (Bosnia), partly plains (Southern Hungary), the Zora, the morning light of Servian hopes, is dawning. In the foreground stands the armed figure of a woman, on whose shield are the names of the "provinces yet to be freed"—Bosnia, Herzegovina, Wojwodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, &c.

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**Annex 1 B. The Chancellor of the German Empire to the Imperial Ambassadors in Paris, London, St. Petersburg**

Berlin, July 23, 1914.

The statements of the Austro-Hungarian Government as to the conditions under which the attempt on the life of the Austrian Crown Prince and his wife occurred make clear the aims of the Pan-Servian propaganda, and the means which it employs to accomplish its ends. Also, in view of the facts brought forward, there is no longer any doubt that Belgrade must be looked upon as the centre of action of the efforts to tear away the southern Slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and effect their union with the Servian Kingdom, and that these efforts develop there with the connivance, at least, of officials of the Government and army.

The Servian machinations go back many years. Servian Chauvinism showed itself in an especially marked form during the Bosnian crisis. That there was no conflict as a result of Servia's provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary at this time was due to the moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intervention of the great powers. The assurances of future good behavior which the Servian Government then gave have not been kept. Under the very eyes, or, at least, with the silent consent, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda has continually grown in scope and intensity; the latest crime, the threads which lead to Belgrade, must be placed to its account. It has become unmistakably apparent that it is incompatible both with the dignity and the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy that it should continue to look on inactively at the plotting across the border, which continually jeopardizes the integrity of its territory. Considering the conditions, the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government cannot but be looked upon as justified. Nevertheless, the attitude adopted recently both by public opinion as well as by the Government in Servia does not preclude the apprehension that the Servian Government will refuse to comply with these demands, and that she is allowing herself to be led into an attitude of provocation toward Austria-Hungary. Unless the Austro-Hungarian Government wishes definitely to give up all claim to its position as a great power there is nothing for it to do but back up its demands on the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by recourse to military measures, in which case the choice of means must be left to it.

I ask your Excellency to express yourself in the above terms to the representative of (Mr. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (Mr. Sazonof) and to

lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one, the settlement of which devolves solely upon Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and one which the powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned. We strongly desire that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences impossible to measure.

I shall await with interest a telegraphic report from you as to the result of your interview.

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## **Annex 2. The Imperial Chancellor to the Confederated Governments of Germany**

July 23, 1914.

Confidential!

Kindly make the following announcement to the Government to which you are accredited:

In view of the facts which the Austro-Hungarian Government has made known in its note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the plot to which the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince and his wife were victims was hatched in Servia, with the connivance, at least, of officials of the Servian Government. It is a product of the Pan-Servian efforts which, during a number of years, have become a source of lasting disquietude for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for all Europe.

Pan-Servian Chauvinism showed itself in an especially marked form during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-control and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intervention of the great powers was it due that the provocation which Austria-Hungary suffered at this time from Servia did not lead to war. The assurances of future good behavior which the Servian Government gave have not been kept by it. Under the very eyes, or at least with the silent consent, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda has continually grown in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with the dignity nor the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy if the latter continued to look inactively upon the plotting across the border, through which the safety and integrity of its territory is menaced. In view of the conditions, the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government must be looked upon as justified.

The answer of the Servian Government to the demands which the Austro-Hungarian Government made on the 23d of the month through its representative in Belgrade makes clear that those at the head of Servian affairs are not inclined to give up the policy hitherto adopted by them, nor their activity as agitators. Therefore, the Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish to give up forever its position as a great power, has nothing left to it but to back up its demands with strong pressure, and, if necessary, by the adoption of military measures.

Certain elements in Russia consider it a natural right and the duty of Russia energetically to take the part of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary. In fact, the *Novoe Vremya* considers itself justified in making Germany responsible for the European conflagration that might result from such a move by Russia, if it does not compel Austria-Hungary

to back down. Here the Russian press takes a wrong view. It was not Austria-Hungary that brought on the conflict with Serbia, but Serbia, which by unscrupulous favoring of Pan-Servian aspirations even in parts of Austria-Hungary's territory, has jeopardized the very existence of the latter, and created conditions which finally found expression in the dastardly crime of Serajevo. If Russia feels constrained to take sides with Serbia in this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it. But she must bear clearly in mind that in so doing she makes Serbia's aspirations to undermine the conditions necessary for the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, identical with her own, and that she alone must bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the Austro-Servian question, which all the rest of the great European powers wish to localize. This responsibility of Russia is perfectly apparent and is all the heavier since Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that there is no intention of acquiring Servian territory, nor of threatening the continued existence of the Servian Kingdom, but that all that is desired is to obtain permanent relief from Servian machinations that threaten Austria's existence.

The attitude of the Imperial German Government in this matter is clearly outlined. The agitation conducted by the Pan-Slavs against Austria-Hungary has, as its principal aim, the dissolution or weakening of the Triple Alliance by means of the destruction of the Danube Empire, and, as a result, the complete isolation of the German Empire. Our closest interests, therefore, summon us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty to save Europe if possible from a general war demands also that we support the efforts to localize the trouble in accordance with the policy which we have successfully followed for the last forty-four years in the interests of the preservation of the peace in Europe. But if, contrary to hope, the trouble should spread owing to the intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an ally, we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the entire might of the German Empire. We shall draw our sword only if obliged to do so, and we shall do it then in the firm conviction that we bear no responsibility for the calamity which a war must needs bring to the nations of Europe.

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### **Annex 3. Telegram from the Imperial German Ambassador in Vienna to the Imperial German Chancellor**

July 24, 1914.

Count Berchtold today summoned the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in order to explain to him in detail and in friendly terms the position of Austria regarding Serbia. After going over the historical developments of the last few years, he laid stress on the statement that the monarchy did not wish to appear against Serbia in the rôle of a conqueror. He said that Austria-Hungary would demand no territory, that the step was merely a definitive measure against Servian machinations, that Austria-Hungary felt herself obliged to exact guarantees for the future friendly behavior of Serbia toward the monarchy, that she had no intention of bringing about a shifting of the balance of power in the Balkans. The Chargé d'Affaires, who as yet had no instructions from St. Petersburg,

took the explanations of the Minister ad referendum adding that he would immediately transmit them to Sasanow.

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**Annex 4. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor**

July 24, 1914.

I have just availed myself of the contents of Decree 592 in a long talk with Sasanow. The Minister made wild complaints against Austria-Hungary, and was much excited. What he said most definitely was this: that Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be confined to the parties concerned.

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**Annex 5. The Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor—Telegram**

July 26, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had a long interview today with Sasanow. Both, as they told me afterward, received a satisfying impression. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary was planning no conquests and simply wished to secure quiet at last on her boundaries visibly calmed the Minister.

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**Annex 6. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor**

July 25, 1914.

Report for his Majesty from Gen. von Chelius. Today the drilling of the troops in the Krasnoe camp was suddenly interrupted and the regiments are to return at once to their garrison posts. The manoeuvres have been given up. The military pupils were promoted to officers today instead of in the Autumn. Great excitement reigns in general headquarters as to Austria's proceedings. I have the idea that all preparations have been made for mobilization against Austria.

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**Annex 7. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor**

July 26, 1914.

The Military Attaché requests the transmission of the following report to the General Staff:

I consider it certain that mobilization has been ordered for Kieff and Odessa. It is doubtful whether this is the case at Warsaw and Moscow, and elsewhere it has probably not been ordered.

**Annex 8. Telegram of the Head of the Imperial German Consulate  
in Kovno to the Imperial German Chancellor**

July 27, 1914.

State of war declared in Kovno.

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**Annex 9. Telegram of the Imperial German Envoy in Berne to the  
Imperial German Chancellor**

July 27, 1914.

Have learned reliably that Fourteenth French Corps stopped manoeuvres.

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**Annex 10. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the  
Imperial German Ambassador in London**

Important!

July 26, 1914.

Austria-Hungary has declared officially and solemnly in St. Petersburg that she contemplates no acquisition of territory in Servia, and that she will not endanger the continuance of the kingdom, but wishes only to secure quiet. According to reports reaching here, Russia is about to summon several bodies of reservists immediately, which would be equivalent to mobilization against us. If this news is corroborated, we shall be forced against our will to take measures to meet it. Today our efforts are still directed toward localizing the trouble and maintaining the peace in Europe. For this reason we ask that the strongest possible pressure be brought to bear in St. Petersburg for achieving this end.

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**Annex 10 A. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the  
Imperial German Ambassador in Paris**

July 26, 1914.

After Austria-Hungary officially declared to Russia that she contemplated no acquisition of territory and would not tamper with the continuance of the Servian kingdom, the decision of the question as to whether there is to be a European war lies with Russia alone, who has to bear the full responsibility. We trust that France, with whom we know we are agreed in the desire to maintain the peace in Europe, will use her influence in St. Petersburg in a quieting manner.

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**Annex 10 B. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the  
Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg**

July 26, 1914.

After Austria formally declared that she was not interested in acquiring territory, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the peace in Europe through Russian intervention lies with Russia alone. We still



trust that Russia will take no steps that may seriously endanger European peace.

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**Annex 11. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Imperial German Chancellor**

July 27, 1914.

Military Attaché reports concerning talk with Minister of War:

Said Sasanow had asked him to explain the situation to me.

The Minister of War then gave me his word of honor that as yet no mobilization order had gone forth, that for the time being merely preparatory measures were being taken, but that not one reservist had been summoned nor a single horse requisitioned. He said that if Austria should cross the Servian frontier, the military districts in the direction of Austria—Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan—would be mobilized, that those on the German front—Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg—would not be under any circumstances. He said that peace with Germany was earnestly desired. To my inquiry as to the purpose of the mobilization against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred me to diplomatic channels. I told the Minister that we appreciated the friendly attitude toward ourselves but would look upon the mobilization against Austria alone as very menacing.

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**Annex 12. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in London**

July 27, 1914.

Nothing is known here as yet as to a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey to hold a four-sided conference in London. It is impossible for us to bring our ally before a European court in its difference with Servia. Our mediatory activity must confine itself to the danger of a Russian-Austrian conflict.

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**Annex 13. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in London**

July 25, 1914.

The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between the Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian conflict is quite correct. We wish as little as England to mix in the first, and, first and last, we take the ground that this question must be localized by the abstention of all the Powers from intervention in it. It is therefore our earnest hope that Russia will refrain from any active intervention, conscious of her responsibility and of the

seriousness of the situation. If an Austro-Russian dispute should arise, we are ready, with the reservation of our known duties as allies, to co-operate with the other great Powers in mediation between Russia and Austria.

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**Annex 14. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg**

July 28, 1914.

We are endeavoring continually to cause Vienna to make clear in St. Petersburg the purpose and scope of the Austrian action regarding Serbia in an indisputable and, it is to be hoped, satisfying manner to Russia. The declaration of war made in the meantime makes no difference in this connection.

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**Annex 15. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in London**

July 27, 1914.

We have started the efforts toward mediation in Vienna immediately, in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey. Moreover, we have communicated to Count Berchtold the wish of Mr. Sasanow for a direct talk with Vienna.

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**Annex 16. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in Vienna to the Imperial German Chancellor**

July 28, 1914.

Count Berchtold requests me to express to your Excellency his deep gratitude for communicating to him the English mediation plan. He remarks, however, concerning it, that, after the opening of hostilities by Serbia and the declaration of war made in the meantime, he must look upon England's step as belated.

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**Annex 17. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in Paris**

July 29, 1914.

Reports to us of French preparations for war increase from hour to hour. I request that you talk on this matter with the French Government and make it clear to them that such measures would lead to precautionary measures on our part. We should be obliged to proclaim the danger of war, and even if this should not mean calling in reserves and mobilization, it would, nevertheless, increase the tension. We still hoped uninterruptedly for the maintenance of peace.

**Annex 18. Telegram of the German Military Envoy in St. Petersburg to His Majesty the Kaiser**

July 30, 1914.

Yesterday Prince Troubetzki told me, after he had caused your Majesty's telegram to Emperor Nicholas to be delivered at once: "God be praised that a telegram from your Emperor has come." He told me a little while ago that the telegram had made a deep impression on the Emperor, but since mobilization against Austria had already been ordered, and Sasonow had doubtless convinced his Majesty that it was no longer possible to recede, his Majesty unfortunately could do nothing to alter matters. I then said to him that the responsibility for the unmeasurable consequences lay on the early mobilization against Austria-Hungary, who was involved after all in a purely local war with Serbia, that Germany's answer thereto was just and that the responsibility lay with Russia, as it had ignored Austria-Hungary's declaration that she contemplated no acquisition of territory from Serbia. I said that Austria-Hungary had mobilized against Serbia, not against Russia, and that there was no cause for Russia to plunge into the question. I added that in Germany we were unable after the frightful crime of Serajevo any longer to understand Russia's words to the effect that "we cannot leave our brothers in Serbia in the lurch." I told him in conclusion that he must not be surprised if Germany's forces were mobilized.

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**Annex 19. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in Rome**

July 31, 1914.

We negotiated continually with a view to reconciliation between Russia and Austria-Hungary, both through direct exchange of telegrams from his Majesty the Kaiser to his Majesty the Czar, as well as in our relations with Sir Edward Grey. But all our efforts are made much more difficult, if not impossible of realization, by Russia's mobilization. In spite of calming assurances, Russia, according to all reports that reach us, is taking such far-reaching steps against us also that the situation becomes constantly more threatened.

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**Annex 20. I. His Majesty to the Czar**

July 28, 10:45 P. M.

With the greatest disquietude I hear of the impression which Austria-Hungary's action against Serbia is making in your empire. The unscrupulous agitation which has gone on for years in Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Francis Ferdinand was the victim.

The spirit which allowed the Servians to murder their own King and his wife still rules in that land. Undoubtedly you will agree with me that we two, you and I as well as all sovereigns, have a common interest in insisting that all those morally responsible for this terrible murder shall suffer deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook how difficult it is for you and your Government to resist the tide of popular opinion. Remembering the heartfelt friendship which has bound us closely for a long time, I am therefore exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia. I earnestly hope that you will help me in my efforts to set aside all obstacles that may yet arise.

Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin.

(Signed) WILHELM.

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### **Annex 21. II. The Czar to His Majesty**

Peterhof Palace, July 29, 1 P. M.

I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask you urgently to help me. A disgraceful war has been declared on a weak nation; the indignation at this, which I fully share, is immense in Russia. I foresee that soon I can no longer withstand the pressure that is being brought to bear upon me, and that I shall be forced to adopt measures which will lead to war. In order to prevent such a calamity as a European war I ask you, in the name of our old friendship, to do all that is possible to you to prevent your ally from going too far.

(Signed) NICHOLAS.

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### **Annex 22. III. His Majesty to the Czar**

I have received your telegram and share your wish for the maintenance of peace. Nevertheless—as I said to you in my first telegram—I cannot consider Austria-Hungary's action "disgraceful war." Austria-Hungary knows by experience that Serbia's promises, when they are merely on paper, are quite unreliable. According to my opinion, Austria-Hungary's action is to be looked upon as an attempt to secure full guarantees that Serbia's promises shall also be turned into deeds. I am confirmed in this view by the statement of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary contemplates no acquisition of territory at the expense of Serbia. I think, therefore, that it is quite possible for Russia to remain in the rôle of a spectator toward the Austrian-Servian war, without dragging Europe into the most terrible war that it has ever seen. I think that a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna is possible and desirable, an understanding which—as I already telegraphed you—my Government is endeavoring to help with all its power. Naturally, military measures by Russia, which Austria-Hungary might take as

threatening, would hasten a calamity that we both wish to avoid, and would undermine my position as mediator, which I have willingly assumed after your appeal to my friendship and help.

(Signed) WILHELM.

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**Annex 23. IV. His Majesty to the Czar**

July 30, 1 A. M.

My Ambassador has been instructed to call your Government's attention to the dangers and serious consequences of mobilization; I said the same thing to you in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary mobilized only against Servia, and at that she mobilized only a part of her army. If Russia, as appears from what you and your Government say, is mobilizing against Austria-Hungary, the position of mediator, which you intrusted to me in a friendly manner and which I accepted at your urgent request, is jeopardized if not rendered untenable. The whole weight of the decision now rests on your shoulders; they must bear the responsibility for war or peace.

(Signed) WILHELM.

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**Annex 23 A. The Czar to His Majesty**

Peterhof, July 30, 1914, 1:20 P. M.

I thank you from my heart for your prompt answer. I am sending Tatisheff this evening with instructions. The military measures now being taken were decided upon five days ago for defensive purposes against Austria's preparations. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any way your position as mediator, which I highly esteem. We need your strong pressure on Austria in order that an understanding may be brought about with us.

NICHOLAS.

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**Annex 24. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg**

July 31, 1914.

In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, and although we ourselves have up to the present moment taken no measures for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy; in other words, mobilized against us also. By these Russian measures we have been obliged, for the safeguarding of the empire, to announce that danger of war threatens us, which does not yet mean mobilization. Mobilization, however, must follow unless Russia ceases within twelve hours all warlike measures against us and Austria-Hungary and gives us definite assurance thereof. Kindly communicate this at once to Mr. Sazonof and wire him of its communication to him.

**Annex 25. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in Paris**

Important!

July 31, 1914.

In spite of our still pending mediatory action, and although we ourselves have adopted no steps toward mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy, which means mobilization against us also. Thereupon we declared the existence of a threatening danger of war, which must be followed by mobilization, unless Russia within twelve hours ceases all warlike steps against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably means war. Kindly ask the French Government whether it will remain neutral in a Russian-German war. Answer must come within eighteen hours. Wire at once hour that inquiry is made. Act with the greatest possible dispatch.

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**Annex 26. Telegram of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg**

Important!

Aug. 1, 1914.

In case the Russian Government gives no satisfactory answer to our demand, will Your Excellency, at 5 o'clock this afternoon (Central European time), kindly hand to it the following declaration:

The Imperial Government has endeavored from the beginning of the crisis to bring it to a peaceful solution. In accordance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in co-operation with England, applied himself to the accomplishment of a mediating rôle toward the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when Russia, without awaiting the outcome, proceeded to mobilize her entire land and naval forces.

Following this threatening measure, occasioned by no military preparation on the part of Germany, the German Empire found itself confronted by a serious and imminent peril. If the Imperial Government had failed to meet this peril, it would have jeopardized the safety and even the existence of Germany. Consequently, the German Government was obliged to address the Government of the Emperor of all the Russias and insist upon the cessation of all these military measures. Russia having refused to accede to this demand, and having manifested by this refusal that her acts were directed against Germany, I have the honor, by order of my Government, to make known to Your Excellency the following:

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the Empire, takes up the defiance, and considers himself in a state of war against Russia.

I urgently ask that you wire the hour of arrival of these instructions, and of their carrying out, according to Russian time.

Kindly ask for your passports and hand over protection and business to the American Embassy.

**Annex 27. Telegram of the Imperial German Ambassador in Paris  
to the Imperial German Chancellor**

Aug. 1, 1:05 P. M.

To my repeated inquiry as to whether France, in case of a German-Russian war, would remain neutral, the Premier declared that France would do that which might be required of her by her interests.

## LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Nos. 1-66 (April, 1907, to May, 1913). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane and others. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.

67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason, June, 1913.

68. American Love of Peace and European Skepticism, by Paul S. Reinsch, July, 1913.

69. The Relations of Brazil with the United States, by Manoel de Oliveira Lima, August, 1913.

70. Arbitration and International Politics, by Randolph S. Bourne, September, 1913.

71. Japanese Characteristics, by Charles William Eliot, October, 1913.

72. Higher Nationality; A Study in Law and Ethics, by Lord Haldane, November, 1913.

73. The Control of the Fighting Instinct, by George M. Stratton, December, 1913.

A New Year's Letter from Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, December, 1913.

The A B C of the Panama Canal Controversy. Reprinted from The Congressional Record, October 29, 1913. December, 1913.

74. A Few Lessons Taught by the Balkan War, by Alfred H. Fried, January, 1914.

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75. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by Nicholas Murray Butler, February, 1914.

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77. Commerce and War, by Alvin Saunders Johnson, April, 1914.

A Panama Primer. Reprinted from *The Independent*, March 30, 1914. April, 1914.

78. A Defense of Cannibalism, by B. Beau. Translated from *La Revue* of February 15, 1909, by Preston William Slosson, May, 1914.

79. The Tradition of War, by Randolph S. Bourne, June, 1914.

The Causes Behind Mexico's Revolution, by Gilbert Reid. Reprint from the *New York Times*, April 27, 1914. June, 1914. The Japanese in California, June, 1914.

80. War and the Interests of Labor, by Alvin S. Johnson. Reprint from the *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1914. July, 1914.

81. Fiat Pax, by George Allan England, August, 1914.

82. Three Men Behind the Guns, by Charles E. Jefferson, D.D., September, 1914.

Special Bulletin. The Changing Attitude toward War as reflected in the American Press. September, 1914.

83. Official Documents Bearing upon the European War. Reprinted Through the Courtesy of the *New York Times*, October, 1914.

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



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